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Abstract  
Despite international efforts in recent decades to eliminate it, child labour 
continues to affect millions of children worldwide. This paper considers 
whether the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (‘CISG’) can be used to prevent child labour. It firstly addresses the 
conformity requirements in art 35 of the CISG, and asks whether these can 
be used to require a seller to deliver child labour-free goods, even where 
this is not explicitly required by the contract. It then considers whether a 
buyer can recover damages if the seller delivers goods that are tainted by 
child labour. It examines the difficulties associated with a claim for 
damages in this context – especially where the only harm suffered by the 
buyer is to its goodwill or its ‘performance interest’ – and suggests how 
such damages might be calculated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
I Introduction  
For decades, the international community has struggled to eliminate child 
labour. The term ‘child labour’ refers to work done by children that 
“deprives [them] of their childhood, their potential and their dignity, and 
that is harmful to physical and mental development.”1 Although child labour 
is prohibited at international law,2 as well as under domestic law in almost 
all states,3  it affects an estimated 168 million children worldwide.4 This 
includes over 85 million in hazardous work.5 The difficulty with preventing 
child labour is that it often takes place in so-called ‘failing states’, where the 
governments are either unwilling or unable to adequately safeguard human 
rights.6 Moreover, the companies that employ children are not (yet) directly 
subject to any human rights obligations under international law. 7  Thus, 
despite the efforts by the international community to prevent child labour, 
many companies throughout the world continue to use it without sanction.  
The inability of international and municipal human rights law to adequately 
prevent corporate human rights abuses such as the use of child labour has 
led to the development of various alternative approaches. These include soft 
law instruments, 8  voluntary initiatives, 9  and the establishment of a UN 
                                                             
1 International Labour Organisation “What is Child Labour” ILO Website <www.ilo.org>. 
2 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 
1989, entered into force 2 September 1990), art 32; Convention (No. 138) Concerning 
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 1015 UNTS 297 (opened for signature 26 
June 1973, entered into force 19 June 1976); Convention (No. 182) Concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
2133 UNTS 161 (opened for signature 17 June 1999, entered into force 19 November 
2000). 
3  Franziska Humbert The Challenge of Child Labour in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2009) at 28. 
4 International Labour Organisation “Child Labour” ILO Website <www.ilo.org>. 
5 International Labour Organisation “Child Labour” ILO Website <www.ilo.org>. 
6  Ingeborg Schwenzer and Benjamin Leisinger “Ethical Values and International Sales 
Contracts” in Ross Cranston, Jan Ramberg and Jacob Ziegel (eds) Commercial Law 
Challenges in the 21st Century: Jan Hellner in Memoriam (Iustus Forlag, Stockholm, 
2007) at 249 and 252; John Ruggie “Business and Human Rights: The evolving 
international agenda” (2007) 101 AJIL 819 at 834; Franziska Humbert, The Challenge of 
Child Labour, above n 3, at 28.  
7 Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights”, above n 6, at 832.  
8 Such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
9  Such as the United Nations Global Compact, the Electronics Industry Citizenship 
Coalition (EICC) Code of Conduct and the Kimberley Process. 
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Human Rights Council working group tasked with creating a binding 
instrument that imposes human rights obligations on corporations at 
international law.10 Another approach, which will be the focus of this paper, 
involves using international sales contracts governed by the UN Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (‘CISG’) to require that 
goods adhere to certain ethical standards, such as being child labour-free. 
This approach is an effective and efficient means of combatting child labour 
for two reasons. Firstly, it does not rely on the (often inadequate) laws and 
enforcement mechanisms in the state where the child labour is employed. 
This is because the prohibition on the use of child labour stems from the 
contract and the CISG, and is therefore enforced like any other contractual 
term. Secondly, if there is a risk that a seller will be liable for damages if it 
delivers goods produced using child labour, this will create a powerful 
disincentive against the use of child labour. Companies are profit-making 
enterprises, and those employing children only do so in order to maximise 
their profits. If it becomes unprofitable to use child labour, companies will 
stop using it. 
Thus, assuming a buyer is able to require a seller to deliver child labour-free 
goods, and this requirement is bolstered by access to effective remedies, 
contracts will be an effective means of preventing child labour. However, 
without an explicit contractual requirement that the goods are produced 
without child labour (which a buyer may not have thought, or considered it 
necessary, to include) can the obligation to deliver child labour-free goods 
be imposed on the seller in any other way? Moreover, even if a seller is 
obliged to deliver child labour-free goods, can the buyer recover damages if 
this obligation is breached? This paper will consider these issues. It will 
argue that in many cases, the conformity requirements in art 35 of the CISG 
require sellers to deliver goods that were produced without using child 
labour, even where this is not explicitly required by the contract. Moreover, 
this requirement is given teeth by the fact that the buyer can recover 
                                                             
10 Rashid Dumbuya “Corporate responsibility to respect human rights: Is the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights up to the task or is there a need for a Treaty on 
Business and Human Rights?” (LLM Paper, University of Dundee, 2014) at 5 and 7. 
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damages in the event of a breach. Thus, the CISG has the potential to be an 
effective tool for preventing child labour.  
Part II of this paper will determine whether sellers can be required under the 
CISG to deliver child labour-free goods without an explicit requirement in 
the contract. It will determine that a seller’s obligation to deliver child 
labour-free goods may arise from the circumstances, including negotiations 
and previous dealings between the parties, from a trade usage in some 
industries, and from the CISG’s requirements that goods must be fit for both 
their ordinary and intended purposes.  
Part III will outline how this issue is complicated by the often long and 
complex nature of international supply chains. It will conclude that sellers 
will generally be responsible for ensuring that child labour was not used in 
any stage of the supply chain, although their liability will often be limited in 
practice.   
Finally, Part IV will determine whether a buyer can recover damages if a 
breach of art 35 is established. It will conclude that a buyer may recover 
damages where it was forced to sell the goods at a lower price as a result of 
the breach, and where the breach resulted in harm to the buyer’s goodwill. 
Goodwill damages will be recoverable whether or not any financial loss 
flows from the loss of goodwill, because goodwill is an asset with financial 
value in itself. It will be further argued that even where a buyer has not 
suffered any pecuniary loss as a result of the breach, it should be 
compensated for the damage to its performance interest. A framework for 
measuring such damages will also be proposed.  
II Can a seller be required to deliver child labour-free goods 
without an explicit agreement? 
A Conformity of the goods  
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The seller’s obligation to deliver conforming goods is dealt with under art 
35 of the CISG. Article 35(1) requires the seller to deliver “goods which are 
of the quantity, quality and description required by the contract”.11  
Article 35(2) states that the goods must:12 
(a) [be] fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would 
ordinarily be used; 
(b) [be] fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to 
the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the 
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable 
for him to rely, on the seller's skill and judgement. 
Whilst art 35(1) deals with what the contract actually requires, art 35(2) sets 
out a series of objective criteria used to determine conformity. 13  It is a 
subsidiary definition which only applies to the extent that the contract does 
not contain any, or contains only insufficient, details of the requirements to 
be satisfied under art 35(1).14 Thus, the primary consideration is whether the 
contract requires the goods to be produced without using child labour. If 
child labour-free goods are not required by the contract, the art 35(2) 
requirements can then be considered. 
B Conformity under article 35(1): can a contract require child 
labour-free goods without an explicit requirement? 
The fact that human rights are violated in the manufacture of goods alone 
does not affect their physical features. However under art 35(1), ‘quality’ 
includes not only the physical condition of the goods, but also “all factual 
and legal circumstances concerning the relationship of the goods to their 
surroundings.”15 Courts have held that non-physical requirements, such as 
                                                             
11 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1489 UNTS 
3 (opened for signature 11 April 1980, entered into force 1 January 1988), art 35(1).  
12 Article 35(2)(a) and (b). 
13 Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG) (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), at 575. 
14 At 575. 
15 At 572-573. 
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the age,16  origin 17  or organic nature of the goods, 18   amount to quality 
requirements under art 35(1). It would therefore be no obstacle to a party 
alleging non-conformity under art 35(1) that the use of child labour did not 
affect the physical quality of the goods.  
1 Can a term prohibiting child labour be established from the 
circumstances? 
Article 8 of the CISG governs the interpretation of parties’ statements and 
conduct.19 It states that:20 
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other 
conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other 
party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.  
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and 
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding 
that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had 
in the same circumstances.  
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable 
person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant 
circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the 
parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent 
conduct of the parties. 
Thus, the primary consideration is the subjective intent of the parties. If the 
parties’ actual intention cannot be established, their statements and conduct 
are interpreted objectively, according to the understanding that a reasonable 
person in the other party’s position would have had in the circumstances. In 
determining the actual or objective intention of the parties, all relevant 
circumstances must be considered.  
Article 9(1) states that “The parties are bound by any usage to which they 
have agreed and by any practices which they have established between 
themselves.” Parties must expressly or impliedly agree to a usage in order to 
                                                             
16 Landgericht (District Court) Berlin, 13 September 2006, 94 O 50/06 (Aston Martin case) 
<www.cisg.law.pace.edu>.  
17  Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court), 3 April 1996, VIII ZR 51/95 (Cobolt 
Sulphate case)  <www.cisg.law.pace.edu>. 
18  Oberlandesgericht (Appellate Court) München, 13 November 2002, 27 U 346/02 
(Organic Barley case) <www.cisg.law.pace.edu>.  
19 Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods, above n 13, at 146. 
20 CISG, above n 11, art 8.  
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be bound by it.21 Unlike under art 9(2) (which will be discussed below), art 
9(1) usages do not need to be internationally recognised.22  
Practices are established through conduct that is repeated with sufficient 
frequency and duration to create a justified expectation that the parties will 
proceed correspondingly in the future.23 Thus, the contract is supplemented 
to reflect the parties’ previous conduct.24 
(a) Contractual negotiations  
In certain situations, a court may interpret parties’ statements and conduct as 
requiring the seller to deliver child labour-free goods. For example, the 
buyer may inform the seller during negotiations that it requires the goods to 
be child labour-free, and the seller may accept this. Whether there is 
sufficient evidence of such a requirement will depend on the circumstances 
of each case.  
(b) Prior transactions  
A requirement that goods be child labour-free may also arise from the 
circumstances if the seller has sold child labour-free goods to the buyer on 
multiple occasions in the past, and has created a justified expectation that it 
will continue to do so.25 This would establish a practice between the parties, 
which is binding on the seller under art 9(1).  
(c) Mutual participation in a voluntary initiative 
Schwenzer and Leisinger argue that if both parties participate in a private 
initiative prohibiting child labour such as the United Nations Global 
                                                             
21 Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods, above n 13, at 185; C Pamboukis “The Concept and Function of Usages in the 
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods” 25 J L Com 107 at 112-
113; Oberster Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court), 21 March 2000, 10 Ob 344/99g 
(Wood case) <www.cisg.law.pace.edu>. 
22 Oberster Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court), 15 October 1998, 2 Ob 191/98x (Timber 
case) <www.cisg.law.pace.edu>. 
23 Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods, above n 13, at 186. 
24 Schwenzer and Leisinger “Ethical Values and International Sales Contracts”, above n 6, 
at 264. 
25 Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods, above n 13, at 186. 
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Compact (‘UNGC’),26 it can be presumed that they have agreed to be bound 
by the standards set out in the initiative.27 This is because “if both parties 
have agreed to certain standards on a broader scale, they must, 
consequently, be deemed to have, at least implicitly, agreed to such a usage 
in their individual contracts.”28  
Ramberg disagrees with this conclusion however, arguing that:29 
It is one thing to generally participate and sponsor a United Nation initiative. 
It is another thing to contractually agree that a contractual party is entitled to 
contractual remedies if an ethical standard is not met. 
Thus, according to Ramberg one cannot assume that just because both 
parties have made a public commitment to uphold certain ethical standards 
in the conduct of their business generally, they must have also impliedly 
agreed that those standards apply to their contract. The fact that both parties 
may have publically communicated their commitment to the UNGC 
principles, for example, does not mean that either has communicated a 
willingness to undertake a contractual responsibility to adhere to those 
principles. 30  Initiatives like UNGC are by their nature voluntary. 
Participants do make certain commitments, however these are aspirational 
and are not intended to bind the participants in any way. It may therefore be 
drawing a long bow to argue that just because a seller has expressed a 
commitment to upholding the principles of a voluntary initiative, it has also 
impliedly agreed to be contractually bound by those principles in every 
international sales contract it enters into with other participants. 
                                                             
26 The Global Compact is a voluntary private initiative that sets out ten principles covering 
human rights, labour the environment and corruption. One of these principles requires that 
the participant businesses “uphold the effective abolition of child labour”. See United 
Nations Global Compact “Overview of the UN Global Compact” Global Compact Website 
<www.unglobalcompact.org>; United Nations Global Compact “The Ten Principles” 
Global Compact Website <www.unglobalcompact.org>. 
27 Schwenzer and Leisinger “Ethical Values and International Sales Contracts”, above n 6, 
at 264. 
28 At 264 
29  Christina Ramberg “Emotional Non-Conformity in the International Sale of Goods, 
Particularly in Relation to CSR Policies and Codes of Conduct” (Research paper, 
Stockholm University, 2014) at 13-14. 
30 At 16.  
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However, can a buyer not reasonably expect a seller, who has also made a 
public commitment against child labour by joining a voluntary initiative 
prohibiting it, to abide by the initiative’s principles in its performance of the 
contract? While the parties may not have explicitly agreed that those 
principles will apply to their contract, they have both made an explicit 
commitment to uphold the principles in all of their dealings. A company 
participating in a voluntary initiative has expressed to the world – including 
potential trade partners – that it does business in a certain way and will 
continue to do so in future. A buyer who has researched into the background 
of a potential seller and discovered that it has (for example) made a public 
commitment to “uphold the effective abolition of child labour” within its 
sphere of influence31 is likely to be led reasonably to believe that the seller 
will deliver child labour-free goods. Therefore, if both parties participate in 
a voluntary initiative which prohibits child labour, and the buyer is aware of 
the seller’s participation, a court will infer an agreement that the ethical 
standards required by the initiative (including the prohibition of child 
labour) apply to their contract.  
(d) Incorporation of standard terms without explicit reference: codes of 
conduct 
A code of conduct (‘Code’) is a document which sets out the social and 
environmental standards that a firm expects its suppliers to abide by. 32 
Where a buyer has a Code requiring suppliers to adhere to certain ethical 
standards (such as not using child labour), this Code can be incorporated 
into the contract as a set of standard terms. Standard terms are “provisions 
which are prepared in advance for general and repeated use by one party and 
which are actually used without negotiation with the other party”.33  
                                                             
31  United Nations Global Compact “The Ten Principles” Global Compact Website 
<www.unglobalcompact.org>. 
32  Mette Andersen and Tage Skjoett-Larsen “Corporate social responsibility in global 
supply chains” (2009) 14 Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 75 at 78. 
33 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010, art 2.1.19(2); CISG 
Advisory Council “Inclusion of Standard Terms under the CISG” (CISG Advisory Council 
Opinion no. 13, Villanova, 2013) at [A1]. 
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The CISG does not give any guidance as to when standard terms are 
included in a contract. However, the CISG Advisory Council has stated that 
standard terms are included in a contract “where the parties have either 
expressly or impliedly agreed to their inclusion…and the other party had a 
reasonable opportunity to take notice of the terms.”34 Thus, where a contract 
clearly refers to the incorporation of standard terms (such as a Code) and the 
terms are made reasonably available at the time, they will be incorporated in 
the contract.35 Likewise, where a buyer otherwise clearly communicates to 
the seller during negotiations that the agreement is subject to its standard 
terms set out in its Code, the seller is deemed to have accepted the inclusion 
of the terms unless it clearly expresses otherwise (assuming the Code has 
been made reasonably available to the seller).36  
Proving the inclusion of a Code becomes more difficult, however, where a 
buyer does not clearly refer to its inclusion, and/or where the Code is not 
physically attached to the contract. One may envisage a situation where a 
buyer prominently displays its Code on its website, and mentions it briefly 
during negotiations, but does not supply it to the seller or expressly stipulate 
that it is incorporated into the contract. Here, a buyer will need to prove that 
the parties impliedly agreed to the inclusion of the Code as a set of standard 
terms, and that the seller had a reasonable opportunity to take notice of the 
terms. 
(i) Implied agreement 
A seller’s agreement to the inclusion of the buyer’s standard terms will be 
inferred where the seller has, through its conduct, led the buyer reasonably 
to believe that it has accepted the inclusion of the terms.37 Whether such an 
agreement can be inferred will depend on the particular circumstances. An 
issue may arise where a buyer attaches its Code to the contract, but does not 
include an incorporation clause in the contract. Here there will be no 
problem with making the terms reasonably available to the seller. However 
                                                             
34 At [B2]. 
35 At [B2.13]. 
36 At [B1.6].  
37 Ramberg “Emotional Non-Conformity”, above n 29, at 11; CISG, above n 11, art 8(2). 
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the seller may claim that by signing the contract, it did not agree to the 
inclusion of the Code.  
There is diverging case law on whether there must be a clear incorporation 
clause where standard terms are attached to the contract.38 The French Cour 
d’appel has held that printing standard terms on the back of an order form 
was not enough to incorporate those terms into the contract, as there was no 
incorporation clause.39 A Spanish Appellate Court also reached the same 
result.40 Conversely, a US Court has more recently held that the inclusion of 
both an offer and a set of standard terms together as attachments to an email 
was sufficient to incorporate the terms into the contract, despite no express 
reference to them in the offer.41  
The CISG Advisory Council has favoured the US decision on the basis that 
it is a more commercially reasonable approach given prevalence of standard 
terms in modern trade.42 Given the importance of the Advisory Council’s 
guidance, Courts are likely to follow the US case in future, and infer that an 
offeree has agreed incorporate into the contract any standard terms that are 
attached to the contract. 
Another issue is whether the buyer is required to explicitly make ethical 
requirements in its Code known to the seller in order for them to be binding. 
If a standard term is “so surprising or unusual that a reasonable person of 
the same kind as the relevant party could not reasonably have expected such 
a term in the agreement”, it does not form part of the contract unless the 
party using the standard terms specifically informs the other party of its 
inclusion.43 However, ethical requirements are now common in Codes, and 
                                                             
38 CISG Advisory Council “Inclusion of Standard Terms”, above n 33, at [B2.1]-[B2.12]. 
39 Cour d'appel (Court of Appeal) Paris, 13 December 1995, 95-018179 (ISEA Industrie v 
Lu) <www.cisg.law.pace.edu>. 
40 Audiencia Provincial (Appellate Court) Navarra, 27 December 2007, (Case involving 
machine for repair of bricks) <www.cisg.law.pace.edu>. 
41 Federal District Court California, 21 January 2010, CV F 09-1424 LJO GSA (Golden 
Valley Grape Juice and Wine LLC v Centrisys Corporation et al) 
<www.cisg.law.pace.edu>. 
42 CISG Advisory Council “Inclusion of Standard Terms”, above n 33, at [B2.12] and [B 
3.2]. 
43 At [B7] and [B7.2]. 
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are not surprising or unusual. Thus, a buyer is not required to highlight them 
in order for them to be included.  
(ii) Reasonable opportunity to take notice of the terms  
According to the Advisory Council, an offeree will have reasonable 
opportunity to take notice of the standard terms where the terms are 
generally accessible online at the time of contracting (as long as the website 
was reasonably available to the other party at the time).44 Thus, if a buyer 
makes the seller aware of its Code, which is available on its website, during 
negotiations, this will likely be enough to give the buyer a reasonable 
opportunity to take notice of its terms. Whether the Code is incorporated 
into the contract will then depend whether an agreement can be inferred 
from the parties’ conduct. 
In sum, a whether the ethical requirements contained in a buyer’s Code are 
included in a contract as standard terms will depend on the circumstances of 
the case. A buyer cannot rely on standard terms that it has neither 
communicated to a seller (during negotiations or via an express clause), nor 
physically attached to the contract. However, it will often be sufficient that 
the buyer has done one of these two things. Of course, best practice would 
be to do both.  
(e) Summary 
This section has discussed the various ways in which a term requiring a 
seller to deliver child labour-free goods can be established from the 
circumstances in the absence of an express clause. It has determined that 
such an obligation can arise from the parties’ negotiations, prior dealings, 
mutual involvement in certain voluntary initiatives and the inclusion of a 
Code as a set of standard terms. The preceding analysis has necessarily been 
open-ended, as much will depend on the circumstances of the individual 
case. The next section will consider whether an obligation to deliver child 
labour-free goods arises from customary international law. 
                                                             
44 At [B3.4].  
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2 Does an obligation to deliver child labour-free goods arise from 
customary international law? 
This section will consider the interplay between public international law and 
the CISG. It will determine whether the prohibition of child labour is 
customary international law, and if so, whether this requires a seller to 
deliver child labour-free goods.  
(a) Is the prohibition of child labour a rule of customary international 
law?  
Customary international law refers to a “general practice accepted as law”.45 
In order for a practice to become customary international law, there must be 
duration, consistency and generality of practice, as well as opinio juris.46 It 
is generally recognised that fundamental principles of human rights are part 
of customary international law.47 This is especially true for the prohibition 
of child labour. Child labour is explicitly prohibited by the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (‘UNCRC’), 48  which has 194 state parties,49 
making it the most widely adopted of all international conventions.50 The 
right of children to be free from child labour is also enshrined in the ILO 
Convention on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment and 
Work51 and the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour,52 
                                                             
45 Statute of the International Court of Justice (1946), art 38(1)(b). 
46 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2008) at 24-25. 
47 At 642. 
48 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 
1989, entered into force 2 September 1990), art 32. 
49 Including the following non-member states: Holy See, Palestine, Cook Islands and Niue 
– the only member states that are not parties are the USA, Somalia and South Sudan: 
United Nations “Convention on the Rights of the Child” United Nations Treaty Collection 
Website <www. treaties.un.org>;  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
“Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard: Convention on the Rights of the Child” 
OHCHR Website <www.ohchr.org>. 
50 John Muncie and Barry Goldson “Youth justice: in a child's best interests?” in Jonathan 
Simon and Richard Sparks (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Punishment and Society (SAGE, 
London, 2013) at 345.  
51 Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 1015 
UNTS 297 (opened for signature 26 June 1973, entered into force 19 June 1976). 
52  Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 2133 UNTS 161 (opened for signature 17 
June 1999, entered into force 19 November 2000); Recommendation (No. 190) Concerning 
the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour (adopted 17 Jun 1999). 
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which have been ratified by 167 and 179 states respectively.53 Thus, the 
prohibition of child labour is not only generally, but universally practiced by 
states, and is also accepted as being binding at international law. It is 
therefore a rule of customary international law.  
(b) The effect of this rule on CISG contracts 
It must now be established whether the fact that the prohibition of child 
labour is a rule of customary international law means that goods delivered 
under a CISG contract must be child labour-free. To answer this question, 
one must first determine whether party autonomy under the CISG is limited 
by mandatory rules of international law. If so, the effect this mandatory rule 
has on a seller’s obligations under the contract must then be determined.  
(i) Is party autonomy under the CISG limited by mandatory 
rules of international law? 
Article 6 of the CISG recognises the principle of party autonomy.54 It states 
that “the parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject 
to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.” 
Unlike the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(‘PICC’) and the Principles of European Contract Law (‘PECL’), 55  the 
CISG does not explicitly state that party autonomy is limited by mandatory 
rules. Some commentators have taken this to mean that party autonomy 
under art 6 is not limited by any mandatory rules that relate to matters 
within the CISG’s scope. 56 In their view, only mandatory rules relating to 
                                                             
53 International Labour Organisation “Ratifications of C138 - Minimum Age Convention” ILO 
Website <www.ilo.org>; International Labour Organisation “Ratifications of C182 - Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention” ILO Website <www.ilo.org>. 
54 Morten Fogt “Contract Formation under the CISG: The Need for a Reform” in Larry 
DiMatteo (ed) International Sales Law: A Global Challenge (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014) at 184. 
55 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010, arts 1.1.3 and 1.4; 
The Principles of European Contract Law 2002, art 1:103. 
56 Ulrich Schroeter “Freedom of Contract: Comparison Between Provisions of the CISG 
(Article 6) and Counterpart Provisions of the PECL” (2002) 6 VJ 257 at 262; Fritz 
Enderlein and Dietrich Maskow International Sales Law: United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods - Convention on the Limitation Period in the 
International Sale of Goods: Commentary (Oceana, New York, 1992) at 49. 
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matters outside the scope of the CISG apply to contracts governed by the 
convention.57  
An example of such a matter is validity. Article 4 states that the CISG is not 
concerned with the validity of the contract, or its provisions. 58  Thus, 
international mandatory rules dealing with questions of validity are 
applicable. However, “the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer 
arising from [the] contract” are within the CISG’s scope.59 Therefore, under 
the above view, party autonomy under art 6 is not limited by mandatory 
rules that determine these obligations. Thus, a term that explicitly requires 
or allows the use of child labour will be found to be invalid because it is 
contrary to the mandatory rule prohibiting child labour, while the same 
mandatory rule cannot be applied to determine the seller’s obligations under 
the contract.  
The above view is arguably supported by art 7(1), which states that: 
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the 
observance of good faith in international trade. 
Article 7(1) emphasises the need for the CISG to be interpreted 
autonomously, and applied in a uniform manner.60 If mandatory rules that 
are within the CISG’s scope of application are applied alongside the CISG’s 
provisions, this risks undermining the uniformity of its application. 
However, art 7(1) is concerned with preventing recourse to domestic laws 
and concepts.61 If the mandatory rules in question are rules of customary 
international law, they are universally applicable, and therefore no problems 
should arise with regards to uniformity.  
Moreover, art 7(1) also emphasises the international character of the CISG. 
The Convention does not exist in a vacuum, and must be interpreted in light 
                                                             
57 Ulrich Schroeter “Freedom of Contract”, above n 56, at 262. 
58 CISG, above n 11, art 4.  
59 Article 4.  
60 Franco Ferrari “Gap-filling and Interpretation under the CISG: Overview of International 
Case Law” (2003) IBLJ 221 at 222. 
61 At 222. 
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of other international law. Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties supports this, stating that when interpreting treaties, “any 
relevant rules of international law” should be taken into account.62 Art 6 
must therefore be interpreted in light of mandatory rules of customary 
international law, and the right to freedom of contract contained in art 6 
must be limited by these rules, regardless of whether they relate to a matter 
within the CISG’s scope. This view acknowledges the international 
character of the CISG, and is also consistent with the PICC and PECL, 
which both explicitly state that party autonomy is limited by mandatory 
rules. 63  As the prohibition of child labour is a rule of customary 
international law, it follows that this rule sets a limit to party autonomy 
under the CISG.  
(ii) Does this rule require a seller to deliver child labour-free 
goods? 
While the mandatory rule prohibiting child labour does set a limit to party 
autonomy under the CISG, it is submitted that it does not require the seller 
to deliver child labour-free goods. Instead, mandatory rules of international 
law only limit party autonomy in the sense that parties may not derogate 
from the rules in their contract. Parties are not required to adhere to those 
mandatory rules in the performance of their contracts. Such a requirement 
would limit party autonomy far more than the PECL and PICC (which 
merely require that parties do not derogate from mandatory rules) allow, and 
would place an unacceptable limit on the right to freedom of contract. 
(c) Summary 
Thus, the fact that the use of child labour is contrary to customary 
international law does not mean that a seller is obliged to deliver child 
labour-free goods.  It will now be considered whether an obligation to 
deliver child labour-free goods arises from a trade usage under art 9(2).  
                                                             
62 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 
May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), art 31(3)(c). 
63 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010, arts 1.1.3 and 1.4; 
The Principles of European Contract Law 2002, art 1:103. 
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3 Is there an international trade usage prohibiting the use of child 
labour? 
A buyer may also argue that the prohibition of child labour constitutes a 
trade usage, thus forming an implied term of the contract. Trade usages refer 
to “practices and rules, which are observed either by the parties in their 
relation or in the respective branch of activity.”64 Article 9(2) of the CISG 
states that:65 
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made 
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew 
or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, 
and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the 
particular trade concerned. 
Thus, the usage becomes an implied term of the contract if it is widely 
known to, and regularly observed by, members of the relevant industry, and 
the parties either knew, or ought to have known about it. Trade usages do 
not need to be expressly agreed upon by the parties – they are so widely 
recognised and observed that the parties’ reliance on them is presumed 
unless they express otherwise.66 Article 9(2) also does not require universal 
knowledge or observance of the usage.67 It is sufficient that it is recognised 
and observed by the majority of persons doing business in the particular 
industry in question.68 Whether a trade usage exists, and what it requires of 
the parties, are questions of fact.69  
The issue in this context is whether the prohibition of child labour amounts 
to a trade usage, either within a particular industry or globally. If so, this 
prohibition forms an implied term in any international sales contracts to 
                                                             
64 C Pamboukis “The Concept and Function of Usages”, above n 21, at 111. 
65 CISG, above n 11, art 9(2). 
66  Sampsa Seppälä “The Responsibilities and Rights of Both Buyer and Seller in 
International Trade Concerning the Conformity of the Goods and Additional Contractual 
Requirements” (LLM Thesis, University of Lapland, 2013) at 23. 
67 Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods, above n 13, at 190. 
68 Wood case, above n 21; Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on 
the International Sale of Goods, above n 13, at 190. 
69 Wood case, above n 21; Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on 
the International Sale of Goods, above n 13, at 192.  
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which the usage applies. Accordingly, this section will consider firstly 
whether the prohibition of child labour is a globally applicable international 
trade usage which applies to all international sales contracts. It will then 
consider whether it constitutes an international trade usage within any 
particular industries. While a comprehensive industry-by-industry analysis 
is beyond the scope of this paper, the apparel and electronics industries will 
be considered as examples.  
(a) Globally applicable trade usage? 
Schwenzer and Leisinger assert that the observance of “minimum ethical 
standards” (such as the prohibition of child labour) is an international trade 
usage, forming an implied term in every international sales contract unless 
the parties agree otherwise. 70  However, Mitkidis argues that while the 
prohibition on child labour may be theoretically accepted worldwide, it is 
not observed by the majority of parties in practice.71 This latter view is 
echoed by other commentators, who suggest that there are certain usages 
(such as the observance of ethical requirements) which may be widely 
acknowledged and adhered to in developed states, but cannot yet be adhered 
to in developing countries. 72   Whether such a usage exists will now be 
considered.  
(i) Freedom of contract and party autonomy  
Party autonomy and freedom of contract are fundamental principles 
underlying the CISG.73 It would arguably be a substantial interference with 
these principles to imply a term prohibiting child labour into every 
international sales contract, regardless of the individual circumstances. 
However, the existence of a trade usage is a question of fact, and whether 
one exists depends on whether it is known to and observed by the majority 
                                                             
70Schwenzer and Leisinger “Ethical Values and International Sales Contracts”, above n 6, 
at 264, 266 and 273. 
71  Katerina Mitkidis “Sustainability Clauses in International Supply Chain Contracts: 
Regulation, Enforceability and Effects of Ethical Requirements” (2014) 1 NJCL 1 at 14-15. 
72 Sampsa Seppälä “The Responsibilities and Rights of Both Buyer and Seller”, above n 66, 
at 24-25; Enderlein and Maskow, International Sales Law, above n 56, at 69. 
73 Matthias Herdegen Principles of International Economic Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2013) at 305.  
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of firms in the relevant industry or marketplace.74 Article 9(2) leaves no 
room for normative considerations, so whether a trade usage would limit 
freedom of contract is irrelevant when determining whether there in fact is 
such a usage 
(ii) International human rights law and the UN Guiding 
Principles 
The worldwide condemnation of child labour is firstly demonstrated by the 
fact that it is prohibited at international law. As mentioned above, child 
labour is prohibited by, inter alia, the ILO Convention on the Minimum Age 
for Admission to Employment and Work, the ILO Convention on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour and the UNCRC, all of which have been widely 
adopted. It is also prohibited by customary international law. This 
demonstrates that, at least at a state level, child labour is condemned 
globally. 
More specifically, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (‘UNGPs’) represent a global condemnation of corporate human 
rights abuses, including the use of child labour. These principles recognise 
that corporations have a responsibility to respect human rights, regardless of 
compliance with (often inadequate) domestic laws. 75  This responsibility 
exists independently of states’ human rights obligations at international law, 
and is a “global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises 
wherever they operate [emphasis added].” 76 These principles were 
unanimously endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council, and have been 
implemented by hundreds of companies.77 Furthermore, they are beginning 
to be implemented by states. 78 The widespread acknowledgement of the 
                                                             
74 Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods, above n 13, at 187. 
75 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Guiding Principles 
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76 At 13.  
77 Caroline Rees “Treaties & the UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights: The 
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to implement the UNGPs within their domestic legal frameworks: Michael Kourabas “US 
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UNGPs and the responsibilities they impose on corporations further 
represents global condemnation of corporate human rights abuses, including 
child labour.  
However, while many may condemn child labour, this condemnation may 
not be extensive enough to form an international trade usage prohibiting it. 
Schlechtriem has suggested that condemnation of practices like child labour 
merely reflects the ethical values of an affluent, well-meaning minority 
rather those of the international trade community generally. 79  In other 
words, the fact that most of the western world finds child labour morally 
repugnant does not necessarily mean this attitude is shared by the majority 
of traders worldwide.  
One must also remember that this issue concerns international trade usages 
between businesses and does not directly involve states. The UNGPs and 
international instruments prohibiting child labour certainly show (at least 
theoretical) condemnation of human rights abuses by the community of 
states. However, this does not necessarily reflect the actual attitudes of 
corporations. For example, out of the 10 countries where the child labour 
problem is most prevalent and severe,80 nine are parties to the UNCRC,81 
nine have ratified the ILO Convention 182,82 and eight have ratified ILO 
Convention 138.83 Furthermore, despite the widespread adoption of these 
international instruments and the supposedly “global” standards imposed on 
                                                                                                                                                           
Promises Action on UN Human Rights Principles” (1 October 2014) TriplePundit 
<http://www.triplepundit.com>. So far five states have produced National Action Plans, 
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Commonwealth Affairs,  National Action Plan, September 2013).  
79 Peter Schlechtriem “Non-Material Damages – Recovery under the CISG?” (2007) 19 
Pace Int'l L Rev 89 at 98. 
80 Maplecroft “Child Labour Index 2014” Maplecroft Website <www.maplecroft.com>. 
81 All except Somalia: United Nations “Convention on the Rights of the Child” United 
Nations Treaty Collection Website <www. treaties.un.org> 
82 All except Eritrea: International Labour Organisation “Ratifications of C182 - Worst Forms 
of Child Labour Convention” ILO Website <www.ilo.org>. 
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C138 - Minimum Age Convention” ILO Website <www.ilo.org>. 
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firms by the UNGPs, there are still 168 million children in child labour 
worldwide. The prevalence of child labour, even in countries that have made 
international commitments to prohibit it, shows a rift between the attitudes 
of states and the corporations within those states. It therefore cannot simply 
be assumed that just because child labour is condemned by the UN Human 
Rights Council and (theoretically) by states, it is also condemned by the 
majority of parties to international trade worldwide.  
(iii) Private initiatives and Codes of Conduct 
However, private initiatives such as the UNGC, the Principles for 
Responsible Investment (‘PRI’) Initiative and the Social Accountability 
8000 International Standard (‘SA8000’) suggest that many firms themselves 
are committed to combatting child labour.  
The UNGC is a voluntary initiative which sets out ten principles covering 
human rights, labour the environment and corruption. 84  One of these 
principles requires that the participants “uphold the effective abolition of 
child labour”.85 UNGC has more than 12,000 corporate participants across 
145 countries.  
The PRI Initiative is an international network of investors committed to 
investing responsibly by incorporating environmental, social and corporate 
governance issues (including human rights and labour standards) into their 
decision-making processes, policies and practices.86 The PRI has more than 
1325 signatories, and the total assets under management exceed US $45 
trillion.87  
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The SA8000 is a voluntary standard requiring companies to adhere to 
certain requirements relating to workplace conditions and workers’ rights, 
including the prohibition of child labour.88 Facilities must be audited by 
independent certification bodies to become certified. There are currently 
3388 certified facilities, employing 2,019,193 employees across 71 
countries and 65 industries.89  
As mentioned above, companies are also increasingly developing codes of 
conduct and policies which prohibit child labour. 90  Indeed, an ILO 
publication has asserted that:91  
the corporate responsibility to protect human rights, including a child’s right 
to be free from child labour, is now widely recognised. Today, companies 
that don’t have a policy against child labour are outside the mainstream 
[emphasis added].  
This all suggests a widespread disapproval of, and commitment to 
combatting child labour among corporations themselves, rather than merely 
at a state level. 
However, the PRI Initiative demonstrates the attitudes of investors, rather 
than actual traders. While these investors may be able to exercise some 
influence on parties to international trade in which they invest, their 
commitment to the PRI does not directly represent the attitudes of parties to 
international trade. The PRI Initiative is therefore only of limited use in 
determining the existence of a trade usage.  
Moreover, although the UNGC and the SA8000 Standard show the attitudes 
of some well-meaning firms, they represent only a small percentage of the 
total firms involved in the international sale of goods. Many UNGC 
members are also not directly involved in the international trade of goods, 
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meaning their participation is irrelevant in terms of determining the 
existence of a usage in the international goods trade. Furthermore, 
participants are not evenly distributed throughout the world. For example, 
while there are there are 951 business participants from France and 1231 
from Spain, there are only 199 and 307 from China and the USA (the 
world’s two biggest manufacturers) respectively, 18 from India, 55 from 
Pakistan, 33 from Russia and 26 from Bangladesh.92 Thus, while UNGC 
shows the attitudes of many corporations in some countries, its utility in 
terms of demonstrating a truly global trade usage prohibiting child labour is 
limited.  
Finally, while codes of conduct provide valuable evidence of companies’ 
attitudes with regards to this type of ethical issue, there is insufficient 
evidence that these are adopted and applied by enough firms across every 
industry to show an international usage that is recognised and observed by 
the majority of parties to international sales contracts worldwide.  
(iv) Summary 
It is tempting to find a global trade usage implying a term into every 
international sale of goods contract prohibiting child labour. This would 
conform to the widely held view (especially among developed countries) 
that child labour is morally repugnant violation of human rights and must be 
prevented. It would also be a useful tool at combatting child labour. 
However, the existence of a trade usage is a question of fact. It does not 
matter whether there should be a usage prohibiting child labour, if in fact 
such a usage does not exist. 
Corporations worldwide are increasingly moving away from the use of child 
labour, and will continue to do so in the coming years. Maybe one day such 
a broad trade usage may be established. However, for now there is simply 
insufficient evidence that the prohibition of child labour is a trade usage 
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which is known to and observed by the majority of corporations involved in 
international trade, across all industries, worldwide.  
(b) Trade usage in particular industries? 
It has been established above that there is no ‘blanket’ global trade usage 
prohibiting child labour. This section will narrow the focus, and consider 
whether such a usage can be found in the electronics and apparel industries. 
(i) Electronics industry  
The Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (‘EICC’) Code of Conduct 
sets out standards relating to social, environmental and ethical issues in the 
electronics industry supply chain. 93  EICC members are required to 
publically commit to the Code and ensure that this commitment is spread to 
their supply chains (at a minimum, members must require all tier one 
suppliers to adhere to the Code).94 Members are held accountable for their 
conduct and that of their suppliers through audits, and are required to 
identify and self-audit high risk facilities.95 The Code prohibits the use of 
child labour at any stage of manufacturing.96 
The EICC comprises around 100 electronics companies with a total 
combined revenue of almost US $2.6 trillion.97 These companies employ 
more than 5.5 million people and have thousands of tier one suppliers.98 
Moreover, over 3.5 million people from 120 countries are involved in the 
manufacture of members’ products.99 EICC members include most of the 
major multinational electronics companies, including Apple, Acer, Hewlett-
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Packard, IBM, Microsoft, LG, Philips, Samsung, Sony, Oracle and 
Xerox.100 Thus, the powerhouse of the electronics industry is comprised of 
EICC members, who are all committed to eliminating child labour from 
both their own activities and at least those of the thousands of companies 
which make up their next-tier suppliers. Some companies also go further 
than merely taking responsibility for their tier one suppliers, and apply the 
Code throughout their supply chains.101  
Furthermore, a 2014 survey of 39 major multinational electronics 
companies found that 85 per cent of the companies surveyed had codes of 
conduct prohibiting the use of child labour, and of those companies, 73 per 
cent included their codes of conduct in their supplier contracts.102   
Child labour undoubtedly still exists in some electronics industry supply 
chains. For example, both Apple and Samsung have come under fire 
recently for the use of child labour in their suppliers’ facilities.103 Apple has 
also discovered 349 child labourers in its supply chain since 2006 through 
supplier audits. 104  However, the fact that child labour does still exist in 
companies’ supply chains does not mean it is tolerated by those companies. 
In Apple’s case, suppliers found to be using child labour are placed on 
probation, and in the most serious cases the business relationship is 
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terminated. 105  Because of the complex nature of supply chains in the 
electronics industry (from extracting the base minerals to manufacturing the 
final product) it is difficult to completely eradicate child labour from a 
supply chain. Despite some incidences of child labour in their supply chains, 
the fact remains that the majority of major electronics companies strive to 
prevent child labour within their spheres of influence.  
The widespread condemnation of child labour by the majority of major 
players in the electronics industry worldwide, as well as these corporations’ 
commitment to expunging child labour from their supply chains, leads to the 
conclusion that the prohibition of child labour constitutes an international 
trade usage within the electronics industry.  
(ii) Apparel industry 
Unlike the electronics industry, the apparel industry does not currently have 
a central, quasi-regulatory initiative like the EICC. However, voluntary 
initiatives such as the Better Cotton Initiative, the Fair Labor Association, 
and the Fair Wear Foundation all indicate efforts in the industry to combat 
child labour at multiple levels of the supply chain.  
The Fair Labor Association (‘FLA’) is a collaborative initiative of 
businesses, universities and NGOs committed to protecting workers’ 
rights.106  The FLA has a Workplace Code of Conduct, which affiliated 
companies are responsible for implementing throughout their entire supply 
chains.107 The Code prohibits child labour. While the FLA covers several 
industries, most of its participants are garment and textile brands and 
manufacturers. Participating companies include Adidas, H&M, Hanes, 
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Hugo Boss, Kathmandu, New Balance, Nike and Puma, as well as a 
multitude of garment and textile manufacturers.108  
The Fair Wear Foundation (‘FWF’) is another organisation working to 
uphold the rights of garment workers and improve their working 
conditions.109 FWF has 80 member companies (representing more than 120 
brands) from across Europe.110 Members must abide by the FWF Code of 
Labour Practices, which prohibits child labour.111  
The abolition of child labour further down the supply chain is also 
supported by a number of leaders in the apparel industry. The Better Cotton 
Initiative (‘BCI’) is an organisation committed to environmentally, 
economically and socially sustainable cotton production. 112  The BCI 
Production Principles and Criteria require that cotton farmers promote 
‘Decent Work’, and prohibits the use of child labour in cotton production.113 
There are 294 members at the supplier manufacturer level, and 31 at the 
retail level.114 Retail members include Adidas, Asos, H&M, Levi Strauss, 
Nike and Sainsbury’s.115  
Moreover, two surveys indicate that, like the electronics industry, many 
clothing companies are committed to eliminating child labour from their 
supply chains. According to a 2013 survey of 41 multinational apparel 
companies (selling under 128 brands), 83 per cent have a code of conduct 
prohibiting the use of child labour by suppliers, and of those companies, 82 
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per cent include their code of conduct in their supplier contracts. 116 
Moreover, 50 per cent apply their codes of conduct (either fully or partially) 
to multiple levels of their supply chains.117 Another survey of 50 (mostly) 
large multinational apparel companies reveals a similar trend. 80 per cent of 
the companies surveyed have supplier codes of conduct which either fully or 
partially prohibit child labour.118 Of those companies, 75 per cent include 
their codes of conduct in their supplier contracts, and 60 per cent either fully 
or partially apply their codes to multiple levels of their supply chains.119  
The above evidence suggests that even though the apparel industry lacks a 
central and unifying entity like the EICC, the majority of major apparel 
companies strive to eradicate child labour from their supply chains. The 
prohibition of child labour therefore amounts to a trade usage in the apparel 
sector, requiring all goods to be child labour-free. 
(c) Summary 
It cannot yet be said that the prohibition of child labour amounts to a global 
trade usage which applies to all international sales contracts governed by the 
CISG. However, industry-specific usages can be found in both the 
electronics and apparel industries. Voluntary initiatives and public pressure 
by socially aware consumers has led these industries to take action against 
child labour. Thus, in these particular industries at least, every CISG 
contract will contain an implied term requiring that the goods are child 
labour-free.  
4 Conclusion  
This subpart has determined that a seller can be required under a contract 
(and thus under art 35(1) of the CISG) to deliver child labour-free goods, 
even without an explicit requirement in the contract. This obligation may 
arise from the circumstances, as well as generally through industry-wide 
                                                             
116 Gershon Nimbalker, Claire Cremen and Haley Wrinkle “The Truth Behind the Barcode: 
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trade usages. Moreover, while it cannot yet be said that there is a globally 
applicable trade usage across all industries, this may happen in the future, as 
more and more businesses come to recognise the economic benefits of being 
socially responsible.  The next subpart will ask whether the objective 
conformity requirements in art 35(2) can also be used to require child 
labour-free goods.  
C Conformity under article 35(2) 
As mentioned above, art 35(2) requires that the goods are fit for any 
particular purpose which is expressly or impliedly made known to the seller, 
where the buyer has reasonably relied on the seller’s skill and judgment.120 
If no such purpose is made known to the seller, the goods must be fit for 
their ordinary purpose.121  It should be noted that art 35(2) only applies to 
the extent that the alleged requirements are not covered by the contract, and 
the following analysis is therefore based on the assumption that a seller is 
not required to deliver child labour-free goods under art 35(1). This subpart 
will consider paragraphs (a) and (b) in turn, and determine whether (and in 
what situations) a seller can be required under art 35(2) to deliver child 
labour-free goods.  
1 Article 35(2)(a): fitness for ordinary purpose 
Article 35(2)(a) requires that goods are fit for their ordinary purpose. Courts 
and tribunals have described the standard as being one of ‘average 
quality’,122 and ‘reasonable quality’.123 First and foremost, goods must be 
able to be resold.124 The fitness of goods for purposes other than resale is 
decided with reference to the objective view of a person in the relevant 
industry, and depends on the individual circumstances of each case.125 Thus, 
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if goods are free from physical defects and can be resold, it is likely that 
they will be fit for their ordinary use.  This would be the case in a situation 
where a buyer unwittingly purchases goods that were produced using child 
labour, but are free from any material defects. As long as the buyer is still 
able to resell the goods (either on their intended market or an alternative 
market), they are fit for their ordinary purpose and the buyer will be unable 
to prove non-conformity under art 35(2)(a).   
However, if the buyer is unable to resell the goods as a result of the use of 
child labour in their manufacture (for example because it became public 
knowledge and consumers refused to purchase the goods), they will be unfit 
for their ordinary use. A more problematic situation however, is if the goods 
can be resold despite the use of child labour, but only at a heavily 
discounted price. Here, the goods are technically resalable, so they are 
arguably fit for their ordinary use. Nevertheless, commentators have argued 
that because goods’ ordinary purpose includes resale, they will be rendered 
unfit for this purpose by defects that substantially reduce their market value, 
regardless of whether they are still fit for their material use.126 Thus, even 
though goods produced using child labour may be fit for all material uses, 
they may still be unfit for resale because their market value has been 
substantially lowered by the use of child labour.   
Assuming the goal of resale is to make a profit, this argument is persuasive. 
If a buyer, originally intending to resell goods for a profit, is forced to sell 
them well below their market value due to a defect (thus losing profits and 
perhaps also selling at a loss), the goods are not fit for the purpose of resale 
in any real sense. They can be resold, but so can most defective goods, if the 
asking price is low enough.127 Consider a situation where a defect renders 
the buyer unable to resell the goods at any price above 25 per cent of their 
regular market value. It cannot truly be said that the goods are fit for the 
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purpose of resale. Thus, if the use of child labour in the production of goods 
leaves the buyer unable to resell the goods, or only able to sell them at far 
below their usual market value, the goods are unfit for their ordinary 
purpose and therefore non-conforming. 
2 Article 35(2)(b): fitness for a particular purpose 
A seller is only responsible for ensuring that goods are fit for a purpose 
other than their ordinary purpose, if that purpose has been (expressly or 
impliedly) made known to it.128 The buyer must also have relied on the 
seller’s skill and judgment as to the fitness of the goods for that purpose, 
and its reliance must have been reasonable.  
For the purposes of this paper, art 35(2)(b) is most relevant in the context of 
goods which are intended for resale in socially conscious markets. Consider, 
for example, a situation where a buyer specialising in fair trade goods 
purchases goods that were produced using child labour. The buyer in this 
situation will argue that the particular purpose of the goods was for resale on 
an ethically conscious market,129 and it therefore required that the goods be 
produced without violating human rights. In order to prove non-conformity 
under art 35(2)(b), the buyer would need to prove that 1) its particular 
purpose was either expressly or impliedly made known to the seller; and 2) 
it reasonably relied on the seller’s skill and judgment as to the fitness of the 
goods for that purpose. This section will determine whether (and if so when) 
a buyer in the above scenario may be able to satisfy these two requirements 
and prove non-conformity under art 35(2)(b).  
(a) When will the buyer’s particular purpose (resale to ethically 
conscious consumers) be made known to the seller? 
The obvious way a buyer could make its particular purpose known to the 
seller is by explicitly informing the seller of the purpose. If the buyer does 
not do this, it will need to argue that the purpose was nevertheless impliedly 
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made known to the seller. Whether a particular purpose has been made 
known to a seller is determined objectively by asking whether a reasonable 
seller could have recognised the particular purpose in the circumstances.130 
The purpose does not need to be a term of the contract.131 A buyer may 
make a seller aware of the purpose merely by communicating an intention to 
use the goods in a certain country.132 Where a seller is made aware of the 
country of use, it is generally responsible for ensuring that the goods adhere 
to both public law standards and the “cultural, religious and ideological 
traditions and persuasions” of that country.133 It has also been suggested that 
a particular purpose relating to ethical values may be impliedly made known 
where available information about the buyer’s company (such as its 
company name) suggests this purpose, or the buyer is widely known for its 
ethical values in the trade sector concerned.134 
This subsection will consider whether knowledge of the buyer’s particular 
purpose can be imputed to the seller in the following situations: 
1. The buyer participates in voluntary initiatives such as the UNGC or 
the EICC Code of Conduct.  
2. The buyer is well-known for both its high ethical standards and its 
focus on fair trade goods. 
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The crucial issue in all of these situations is whether (and if so, to what 
extent) art 35(2)(b) obliges a seller to inquire into the buyer’s affairs as part 
of its due diligence. 
(i) Voluntary initiatives 
CSR initiatives such as the EICC and UNGC require members to respect 
and uphold human rights, and specifically prohibit child labour. Members of 
these initiatives have publically denounced the use of child labour and are 
committed to eliminating it. A buyer may therefore argue that the mere fact 
that it is a member of voluntary initiatives like the EICC and UNGC is 
enough to make a reasonable person in the seller’s position aware that the 
goods were intended for sale to socially conscious consumers, and therefore 
needed to be child labour-free.  
However, this argument runs into two problems. Firstly, the fact that a 
company has made a commitment to combat child labour does not 
necessarily mean that its goods are intended to be sold on a socially 
conscious market, and therefore that its consumers require the goods to be 
produced ethically. An EICC member, such as Samsung, may not sell its 
products on any particularly ethically sensitive market, despite having taken 
a public stand against child labour. Equally, a company may exclusively 
deal in fair trade products without being a member of any voluntary 
initiatives. Whether a company is a member of a voluntary initiative is not a 
clear determinant of its target market and the requirements of its customers. 
Thus, the mere fact that a buyer is, for example, a member of UNGC would 
not lead a reasonable person in the position of the seller to believe that the 
goods were intended to be sold on a socially conscious market. 
Further, it would be unduly burdensome to require a seller to research which 
voluntary initiatives the buyer participates in, as part of its due diligence. 
While the members of the various initiatives can easily be found online,135 it 
is simply not the seller’s responsibility dig up information about any ethical 
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convictions that the buyer might hold, if the buyer has not given it any 
reason to do so. Requiring a seller to do this would be overly onerous, and 
inconsistent with the wording of art 35(2)(b), which places the onus on the 
buyer to inform the seller of its particular purpose. This conclusion is also 
consistent with the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof  in the New Zealand 
Mussels case, which states that a seller is not expected to know about public 
law standards in the country of use that are “specialised” or “not easily 
determinable”,136 and therefore limits a seller’s required due diligence under 
art 35(2)(b).  
Thus, the fact that a buyer participates in a private initiative aimed at 
eliminating child labour is not enough on its own to make its purpose known 
to the seller. This is the case whether or not he seller has actual knowledge 
of the buyer’s involvement with the initiative. The case may be different, 
however, if this is combined with other factors such as the buyer’s 
reputation.  
(ii) The buyer’s reputation and character 
If a buyer is well-known for specialising in ethically produced goods, this 
may be enough to impute knowledge of a particular purpose to the seller. 
While the buyer may not have taken any specific action to inform the seller 
of its particular purpose, in some cases its reputation may speak for it. 
Consider, for example, a retailer called ‘The Ethical Goods Warehouse’ 
which has an established reputation as a socially responsible retailer, selling 
a range of fair trade, free range, sustainable and organic products. Suppliers 
dealing with such a company could not be unaware of its need to provide 
ethically produced goods to its target market. Thus, while the buyer may not 
explicitly communicate its particular purpose to the seller, its reputation 
(and the way it holds itself out) makes the purpose impliedly known to the 
seller.  
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In sum, while membership of voluntary initiatives alone is insufficient, a 
buyer may impliedly make its particular purpose known to the seller through 
its reputation and the way it holds itself out to the public and the industry.  
(b) When will the buyer’s reliance on the seller’s skill and judgement be 
reasonable? 
In order to prove non-conformity under art 35(2)(b) it must also be shown 
that the buyer has reasonably relied on the seller’s skill and judgment as to 
the fitness of the goods for the particular purpose. Reliance will generally be 
reasonable where the seller is (or holds itself out as being) an expert in the 
manufacture of goods for the purpose required by the buyer.137 If the seller 
is responsible for manufacturing or procuring goods, it will generally be in 
the best position to determine their fitness for their intended use.138  The fact 
that the buyer is also knowledgeable in the particular area does not 
necessarily render its reliance unreasonable.139 However, reliance is unlikely 
to be reasonable where the buyer is more knowledgeable or experienced 
than the seller.140  
In the context of ethical standards and art 35(2)(b), Schwenzer and 
Leisinger do not foresee this requirement causing any problems for a 
buyer.141 However, Ramberg disagrees, arguing that when a buyer has more 
knowledge and experience “regarding how to make profits from feelings 
and emotions” than its supplier, the buyer cannot reasonably rely on its 
supplier’s skill and judgement.142 Suppliers are usually solely focussed on 
producing physically conforming goods, and are not concerned with the 
goods’ ‘emotional characteristics’.143 Ensuring that the goods are fit for the 
buyer’s particular purpose (to profit from the goods’ ‘emotional 
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characteristics’ by selling them to socially conscious consumers at a 
premium) is the expertise of the buyer, not the seller, and any reliance on 
the seller’s skill of judgement as to fitness for this purpose is 
unreasonable.144 
Ramberg’s argument has a lot to commend it. Indeed, a buyer specialising 
in selling ethical goods to target market will know more about that market 
and what is required to satisfy its needs than its supplier will. The seller 
(especially given that it is based in a different country) may have 
insufficient knowledge of the buyer’s target market to give an informed 
opinion as to the adherence of the goods to the consumers’ ethical values. 
Also, the seller may not be an expert in the manufacture of ethical goods, or 
hold itself out as such. It would therefore seem that the fitness of the goods 
for this purpose is best determined by the buyer, and any reliance on the 
seller will be unreasonable.  
However, at least in the context of child labour and other labour rights 
violations, Ramberg’s reasoning is problematic. The point Ramberg seems 
to miss is that when the seller produces goods using child labour without the 
buyer’s knowledge, it is the only one of the parties with sufficient 
knowledge to judge the fitness of the goods for the particular purpose. 
While many companies can conduct ethical audits, a buyer cannot be there 
to monitor the seller’s manufacturing process all the time. It therefore relies 
on the seller to produce goods that are fit for the purpose that it has 
(expressly or impliedly) communicated to the seller. While the buyer 
undoubtedly has more knowledge and expertise regarding the sale of ethical 
goods on its target market, if it is established that the particular purpose has 
been made known to the seller, then the seller knows that the goods must be 
produced in compliance with human rights. Knowledge of this requirement, 
combined with the seller’s superior knowledge of its manufacturing 
processes, make it the more suitable party to determine the fitness of the 
goods for their purpose. Schwenzer and Leisinger are therefore correct that 
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in this context, a buyer’s reliance on a seller’s skill and judgement will be 
reasonable.  
(c) Summary 
The above analysis demonstrates that, even if a buyer does not explicitly 
inform the seller of its intention to sell the goods on a socially conscious 
market (and thus that the goods must be child labour-free), in some 
situations the buyer’s reputation and image will speak for it. Moreover, at 
least when the seller is aware of the use of child labour in the production of 
the goods and the buyer is not, the seller will be in a better position to 
determine whether the goods are suitable for the particular purpose.  
3 Conclusion  
This subpart has considered whether a seller may be required under art 
35(2) to deliver child labour-free goods. It has established firstly that if the 
seller’s use of child labour in the manufacture of the goods renders the 
buyer unable to resell the goods, or only able to do so at substantially below 
their market value, the goods will be unfit for their ordinary purpose. 
Furthermore, where the buyer has a reputation for specialising in the sale of 
ethical goods and holds itself out this way to the public, this may suffice to 
make its particular purpose known to the seller. Thus, article 35(2) provides 
us with two more ways in which a buyer may establish the non-conformity 
of goods produced using child labour.  
III The supply chain problem  
A The problem  
Part II has established that, in theory, a buyer may successfully prove that 
goods produced using child labour are non-conforming, even without an 
express clause imposing ethical obligations on the seller. This is based on 
the assumption that the seller is also the manufacturer of the goods, and is 
responsible for the employment of child workers.  
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However, it is often not this simple. Many companies have very long and 
complex global supply chains, beginning with the extraction of raw 
materials and ending with the delivery of the finished product. For example, 
coltan, a metallic ore mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo (‘DRC’) 
from which tantalum is extracted and used in the manufacture of electronics, 
goes through at least ten intermediaries before reaching consumers.145 The 
coltan is firstly mined, then passed through several intermediaries within the 
Congo. 146  The ore is then transported overseas for processing. 147  The 
processed tantalum is then sold to capacitor producers, who produce 
capacitors which are then assembled into circuit boards by other 
companies. 148  These circuit boards are then supplied to electronics 
manufacturers, who produce the final product.149  
Human rights abuses can take place at any stage of these complex supply 
chains, and often occur at the bottom (extraction) levels. For example, many 
mines in the DRC producing ‘conflict minerals’ such as coltan, tungsten and 
tin are controlled by rebel groups who commonly use forced and child 
labour. 150  If a seller is contractually obliged to deliver goods that are 
produced ethically, the issue then becomes: how far does this responsibility 
extend?  
Consider, for example, an electronics manufacturer (M Ltd) that produces 
smart phones for a leading electronics company (E Ltd). While M Ltd does 
not use child labour in its manufacturing facilities, the goods sold to E Ltd 
contain tantalum produced using coltan, which was extracted by child 
workers in the DRC. Thus, child labour has been involved in the production 
of the goods. Can M Ltd be held liable for delivery of non-conforming 
goods under art 35? Would it make any difference if the child labour took 
place in the facility of a capacitor producer (two tiers below M Ltd), and 
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thus the capacitors are tainted by child labour? What about if the circuit 
boards that are supplied directly to M Ltd by its next tier sub-supplier are 
produced using child labour?  
The answer to these questions depends on the scope of M Ltd’s contractual 
obligation. If it is required not to use child labour in its own manufacturing 
process, it cannot be held responsible for the actions of other members of 
the supply chain. However, what if M Ltd has a more general obligation to 
deliver child labour-free goods? 
B To what extent is a seller responsible?  
Supply chains often run through several countries, and suppliers will usually 
have little knowledge and control over the lower levels of the chain. 
Holding M Ltd liable for the human rights violations perpetrated without its 
knowledge, by parties outside its control, would appear to place an unfair 
burden on it. If E Ltd wishes to ensure that no child labour is used anywhere 
in its supply chain, it can do this by rigorously auditing every level of the 
chain and demanding that ethical standards are observed.  
However, if M Ltd is contractually obliged to deliver child labour-free 
goods, it must do this. Under the CISG, a seller is strictly liable for the 
conformity of the goods it delivers.151 Thus, if child labour has been used at 
any stage of the goods’ production, M Ltd will be in breach. Consider if the 
con-conformity was due to a physical fault in a circuit board that M Ltd 
bought from its supplier and installed in its product. If M Ltd’s smart phone 
does not function because of the faulty circuit board, M Ltd cannot claim its 
goods conformed to the contract just because the fault was caused by 
another party. M Ltd will be liable for the non-conformity, and it will then 
be up to it to seek indemnity against its supplier. Similarly, in the case of a 
non-physical defect like this, M Ltd will be liable if the goods are non-
conforming, and must seek indemnity for any losses suffered against the 
party who used child labour. 
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Unfortunately for a party in M Ltd’s position, this will be difficult for two 
reasons. Firstly, it may not have a direct contractual relationship with the 
perpetrator. Secondly, even if the perpetrator is M Ltd’s supplier, the same 
contractual obligation to deliver child labour-free goods may not exist 
between M Ltd and its supplier. It may therefore be difficult for an innocent 
supplier in M Ltd’s position to hold the culpable party liable for the non-
conformity. This creates all the more incentive for suppliers like M Ltd to 
impose ethical requirements on their own sub-suppliers.  
However, while a seller will in theory be liable for the use of child labour 
anywhere in the supply chain, in practice its liability will be limited. This is 
because the further down the supply chain one goes, the harder it becomes 
to prove that the goods are tainted by child labour. For example, in the case 
of coltan mined using child labour in the Congo, once the coltan reaches the 
refinery, it is melted down and mixed with other coltan from different 
sources.152 It therefore becomes impossible to trace its origin.153 Likewise, 
cotton sourced from farms employing children will likely be mixed with 
(and become indistinguishable from) cotton from other farms. Thus, a 
buyer’s ability to hold a seller liable for the use of child labour far down the 
supply chain will in many cases be limited.  
C Conclusion  
In sum, the long and complex nature of many supply chains further 
complicates this issue. Given the prevalence of child labour in many 
countries, it may be that despite the buyer’s best efforts (and through no 
fault of the seller), goods end up being tainted with child labour at one of 
the lower levels of the supply chain. Where there is a general obligation to 
deliver child labour-free goods, sellers will theoretically be liable for the use 
of child labour further down the supply chain.  However, whether a breach 
can be established in practice will depend on whether the buyer can prove 
that child labour was actually used in the production of the particular goods.  
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IV Damages 
This final part will consider when an aggrieved buyer can recover damages 
where it purchases non-conforming goods produced using child labour. It 
will consider whether damages would be available to an aggrieved buyer in 
the following three situations:  
1. The goods are delivered to the buyer, and the buyer becomes aware 
of the non-conformity before it has on-sold the goods.154 
2. The buyer becomes aware of the non-conformity after it has on-sold 
the goods, and the non-conformity becomes public knowledge, 
damaging the buyer’s reputation.  
3. The buyer discovers the non-conformity after it has on-sold the 
goods, and the non-conformity does not become public 
knowledge.155   
Damages are governed by art 74 of the CISG, which states that:156 
Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the 
loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of 
the breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach 
foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought 
to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. 
Article 74 recognises the principle of ‘full compensation’, and must be 
“liberally construed to compensate an aggrieved party for all disadvantages 
suffered as a result of the breach.”157 
A Discovery of the non-conformity before the goods are on-sold 
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If the buyer decides to resell the goods despite the non-conformity, it can 
claim damages for lost profits, as well as any loss suffered and additional 
expenditures involved with resale.158 If it cannot resell the goods as a result 
of their tainted reputation, it will be able to claim damages for lost profits.159 
If the buyer refuses to resell the goods and claims damages for loss of profit, 
the seller may argue that it cannot recover because it has failed to mitigate 
its loss. Article 77 states that:160 
A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are 
reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, 
resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in 
breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss 
should have been mitigated. 
However, it is submitted that a reasonable buyer would not resell the goods 
if to do so would be likely to harm its reputation. This is especially so in the 
case of buyers with highly ethical reputations and socially conscious target 
markets. However, it is also true for buyers selling on ‘mainstream’ 
markets. Thus, a buyer will have no problem recovering damages in this 
first situation.  
B Discovery of the non-conformity after the goods have been on-sold 
– harm to goodwill  
1 Financially quantifying loss of goodwill  
Harm to goodwill is recoverable under art 74.161 However, because art 74 
does not allow recovery for non-pecuniary loss, an aggrieved party must 
quantify the harm to its goodwill in terms of financial loss, and establish 
with “reasonable certainty” that it suffered financial loss as a result of the 
breach. 162  The aggrieved party must also prove the extent of its loss, 
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although this does not need to be done with “mathematical precision”.163 It 
must merely “provide a basis upon which a tribunal can reasonably estimate 
the extent of damages.”164 
Goodwill is “notoriously difficult to define”, and financially quantifying 
harm to goodwill is therefore a difficult task.165 Commentators have defined 
loss of goodwill in several ways, including loss of future profits, a 
deterioration of commercial image quantified by a loss of customers, and a 
decrease in the value of a business interest.166 While these definitions are of 
some use, a claimant may have trouble proving that the financial loss was 
actually caused by the breach. For example it may be obvious that the 
breach has harmed the buyer’s reputation, but actually proving a causal 
connection between the breach and the financial loss suffered will often 
involve guesswork and speculation.167  
(a) Financial loss resulting from the harm to goodwill 
A buyer who has suffered some discernible financial loss since the use of 
child labour became public knowledge may be able to claim damages for 
loss of goodwill. The loss could be a loss of sales, customers or investors, or 
a fall in share price (if the buyer is publically listed). Whether the buyer can 
prove with reasonable certainty that this loss was a result of the seller’s 
breach will depend on the circumstances. If, for example, the buyer receives 
emails from customers terminating the business relationship on account of 
the buyer’s ‘unethical practices’, causation will not be a problem. On the 
other hand, if the buyer experiences a fall in sales or a drop in its share price 
with only a temporal connection to the reputational harm, a court may find 
that there is no clear causal link, as the financial loss could have been due to 
a number of factors unrelated to the breach.  
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In establishing a causal connection, expert testimony, financial data and 
market surveys and analysis may be of use to a buyer.168 For example, it 
may be sufficient that a buyer provides market surveys demonstrating a loss 
of trust in its brand since the use of child labour became public knowledge, 
coupled evidence of a loss of sales. Equally, a seller may be able to negate 
any causal connection by producing evidence of increased competition in 
the market, business mismanagement and increased costs. 169  Ultimately 
however, a buyer’s ability to prove a causal connection will depend on the 
individual facts of the case 
(b)  ‘Pure’ loss of goodwill  
A more difficult question is whether a buyer can recover damages where 
there is clear harm to the buyer’s reputation, but it has not suffered any 
discernible financial loss (or any financial loss suffered cannot be causally 
linked to the harm to its goodwill). Can the buyer recover damages for loss 
of goodwill alone, or does there need to be financial loss flowing from the 
loss of goodwill?170 Moreover, if damages for pure loss of goodwill are 
recoverable, how would they be measured? 
(i) Are damages for pure loss of goodwill recoverable? 
The Landgericht Darmstadt has held that pure loss of goodwill is not 
recoverable, stating that:171 
A damaged reputation is completely insignificant as long as it does not lead 
to a loss of turnover and consequently lost profits…As long as [the buyer] 
has the necessary turnover, it can be completely indifferent towards its image 
[emphasis added]. 
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The same view was taken by the French Cour d’appel, which held that the 
“deterioration of commercial image is not compensable damages in itself if 
it did not entail proved pecuniary damages [sic]”.172  
These approaches assume that harm to goodwill alone is a non-pecuniary 
loss, which is not recoverable under the CISG. However, commentators 
have argued that the value of goodwill is such that it is an asset in itself, and 
therefore any harm to goodwill is pecuniary in nature.173 It is suggested that 
goodwill is an asset because, inter alia, it allows companies to charge 
premium prices for products, incur less marketing costs, attract the best 
employees, and receive better loyalty from customers and employees.174 It is 
therefore viewed as a strategic resource which gives companies a 
competitive advantage.175 If harm to goodwill can be characterised in this 
way, this would prima facie allow recovery of damages without separate 
financial loss. 
It is clear that goodwill is an asset with economic value. Companies invest 
considerable time and money into building and preserving their reputations. 
Moreover, substantial amounts are paid for the right to trade under certain 
brand names (thus using the brand’s goodwill). If a breach damages the 
reputation and identity that a company has carefully (and expensively) 
cultivated, the company’s loss must be characterised as financial. Thus, 
when properly characterised, pure loss of goodwill is a pecuniary loss, and 
damages are therefore recoverable.  
(ii) How could damages for pure loss of goodwill damages be 
calculated?  
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While it has been established that damages for pure loss of goodwill should 
be allowed, how to calculate these damages in practice is another issue 
entirely. Calculating damages for loss of goodwill without any discernible 
financial loss is by no means straightforward. However, the principle of full 
compensation, which governs art 74, must be kept in mind. Difficulties with 
calculation should not prevent a deserving claimant from recovering 
damages where it can establish an actual pecuniary loss.  
The general measure of damages for loss of goodwill should be “the 
difference between the value of reputation/goodwill before and after the 
loss.”176 Saidov suggests several methods of measuring this loss of value. 
These include:  
1. Determining the difference between the royalty payments a third 
party would be willing to pay to lease the claimant’s company name 
before and after the loss (‘the royalty method’);177  
2. Determining the difference between the company’s actual profits 
and the profits it expected to earn but for the loss (‘the expected 
profits method’);178  
3. Calculating the difference between the market value of the business 
and the value of its assets (the difference being the value of the 
goodwill), before and after the loss (‘the market value method’);179 
and  
4. Estimating the cost or likely cost of repairing the damage to the 
goodwill (‘the cost of cure method’).180  
The problem with using the ‘expected profit’ method to quantify pure loss 
of goodwill is that, unlike the other methods, it requires a claimant to 
establish actual financial loss flowing from the loss of goodwill. It is not 
concerned with the value of the lost goodwill itself. It is therefore unsuitable 
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for measuring pure loss of goodwill where there is no separate financial 
harm flowing from the loss.  
The other three methods, on the other hand, are all capable of calculating the 
value of the lost goodwill itself, and are thus suitable in this context. The 
‘royalty’ and ‘market value’ methods are both useful methods of measuring 
loss of goodwill where sufficient evidence is available. However, the 
required evidence may be difficult for a claimant to obtain. In particular, 
royalty rates may not be available. 181  Moreover, a claimant may have 
suffered serious damage to its goodwill, but be unable to show that it has 
lost potential royalties, or that the difference between its market value and 
its asset value has decreased. Consider for example a large company like 
Apple. Public revelations of the use of child labour in its supply chain182 
have undoubtedly affected the goodwill it has spent time and money 
cultivating. However, it is unlikely that this smear on Apple’s reputation 
would have any noticeable effect on its market value or its ability to charge 
royalties. If these methods of calculation were relied on, Apple would be 
unable to recover damages, despite clear harm to its reputation. Thus, these 
methods will not always adequately compensate a claimant.  
Where the ‘market value’ and ‘royalty’ methods are unsuitable, damages 
should be assessed based on the ‘cost of cure’ method. It is true that this 
method is less precise than the other two in terms of calculating the exact 
value of goodwill lost.  However, it is submitted that this more discretionary 
method is required to deal with situations like the one outlined above, where 
there is clear harm to a company’s reputation, but this does not have a 
discernible impact on the price others are willing to pay in order to buy or 
lease the company’s name. This method has been endorsed by the 
Tampereen Käräjäoikeus, which granted damages in part based on the 
expense incurred by the aggrieved buyer in “regaining [its] reputation and 
credibility” and creating new customer networks.183 
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Under this method, damages would be calculated by reference to both what 
the claimant has already spent on repairing the harm to its goodwill, as well 
as any future costs. 184  These costs must be reasonable in the 
circumstances.185 Thus, this measurement will involve an overall assessment 
of what it would be reasonable for a claimant to spend on repairing its 
goodwill, in light of all the circumstances. In this context, these 
circumstances should include the extent of the claimant’s public ethical 
commitment, including participation in private CSR initiatives.186 This gives 
an indication of how central ethical values are to the company’s identity, 
and thus how much its identity is harmed (and its credibility undermined) as 
a result of being associated with child labour. Moreover, the level of public 
backlash against the buyer resulting from the breach should be considered.  
The exact steps taken by a claimant to rebuild its reputation will differ 
between cases. However, they may include showing a commitment to 
combatting child labour by joining voluntary initiatives, introducing a new 
supplier code of conduct and conducting ethical audits of its suppliers. A 
claimant may also attempt to rebuild its image and denounce child labour 
through marketing campaigns or social media. It will be up to a judge or 
arbitrator to determine a reasonable sum of damages to reflect the cost of 
these curative measures in light of the circumstances.  
To summarise, one of three methods may be used to calculate damages for 
pure loss of goodwill. Where a claimant cannot quantify the harm to its 
goodwill exactly using the ‘royalty’ and ‘market value’ methods, this should 
not necessarily be fatal to its claim. A more discretionary remedy based on 
the cost of curing the harm to its goodwill should also be available. There 
would inevitably be a deal of discretion and uncertainty involved in 
applying such a measure. However it is necessary if the buyer is to be 
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properly compensated in accordance with the principle of full 
compensation.  
 2 Is the loss foreseeable? 
Schwenzer and Leisinger contend that loss of goodwill will always be 
reasonably foreseeable as a possible consequence of a breach of ethical 
standards.187 However, does the fact that a buyer’s consumers are likely to 
strongly disapprove of child labour come within “the facts and matters of 
which [the seller] then knew or ought to have known” at the time the 
contract was concluded, 188 thus making it reasonably foreseeable that being 
associated with child labour would harm the buyer’s reputation? It is 
submitted that it does. It has been established above that child labour is a 
serious human rights violation that is contrary to both international law and 
the domestic laws of most countries. A seller should therefore know that 
harm to a buyer’s reputation as a result of being associated with child labour 
is at least a possible consequence of the breach.  
3 Conclusion 
In sum, if the use of child labour is discovered (and made public) after the 
buyer has on-sold the goods, it may be able to recover damages for loss of 
goodwill, even when there is no discernible financial loss flowing from the 
goodwill harm.    
C Non-conformity is discovered after goods are on-sold but does not 
become public knowledge – no harm to goodwill  
This final subsection will consider whether a buyer should be able to 
recover damages where it discovers the breach after on-selling the goods, 
but the use of child labour does not become public knowledge. Here, there is 
no financial loss flowing from the breach. Any loss is therefore non-
pecuniary, which means no damages would be awarded under the CISG.189 
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However, it is proposed that damages should be recoverable in this 
situation, despite the non-pecuniary nature of the loss. This subsection will 
firstly identify the loss suffered by a claimant in this situation, before 
arguing that this loss should be compensated with damages under art 74. 
Finally, it will recommend how such damages should be measured.  
1 Non-pecuniary loss and the performance interest 
In the situation mentioned above, the buyer is in no worse position 
financially than it would have been but for the breach. Thus, there is no 
actual financial loss flowing from the breach. However, the buyer has not 
received the benefit of the bargain that the contract was intended to deliver. 
If a buyer and seller agree that the goods will be produced according to 
certain requirements, the buyer has a right to receive goods that conform to 
these requirements. This right to performance of the contract is referred to 
as its ‘performance interest’.190 Here, the buyer and seller have agreed that 
the goods will be produced without child labour, and the goods do not 
conform to this requirement. The buyer has therefore suffered a loss in that 
it has not received the goods it bargained for. It has been deprived of its 
performance interest. The issue therefore becomes whether this is the kind 
of loss a buyer should be compensated for, or whether (as is currently the 
case) compensation under art 74 should be strictly limited to financial loss.  
2 Should damages be awarded to protect the claimant’s performance 
interest?  
This question highlights two opposing views of contract damages: the 
‘economic benefits’ principle and the ‘performance principle’. 191  The 
economic benefits principle states that a claimant should only be 
compensated for economic loss resulting from the breach.192 This is based 
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on the premise that the only function of contract damages is to protect the 
economic position of the aggrieved party.193 Thus, non-pecuniary losses are 
not recoverable, and the claimant’s performance interest is irrelevant if it 
has suffered no financial loss. According to the performance principle, on 
the other hand, the function of contract damages also includes the protection 
of the aggrieved party’s performance interest.194 This means an aggrieved 
party should be compensated for both its right to receive the economic value 
of performance, and also its right to receive performance per se.195  
The obvious argument in favour of the economic benefits theory is that 
allowing damages without any actual financial loss provides a windfall 
profit for the aggrieved party, placing it in a better financial position than it 
would have occupied but for the breach. 196  However, this argument 
represents an overly simplistic view of the loss suffered by the aggrieved 
party. The buyer pays the price it does “precisely to obtain the correct 
performance of the contract.” 197  Had the buyer known the goods were 
defective, it would not have paid the same price, and may not have bought 
them at all.198 Thus, the buyer has been denied the goods that it has both 
bargained and paid for, as well as the opportunity to enter into the contract 
at a lower price. This is a real – and in the view of some commentators, 
pecuniary199 – loss, which should be compensated.  
The performance principle gains support from soft law initiatives. Both the 
PICC and the PECL allow recovery for non-pecuniary loss. 200  The 
preference for the performance principle demonstrated by these two newer 
                                                             
193 Ingeborg Schwenzer, Pascal Hachem and Christopher Kee Global Sales and Contract 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 583. 
194 At 584; Brain Coote “Contract Damages”, above n 190, at 542. 
195 Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee Global Sales and Contract Law, above n 193, at 585. 
196 Schwenzer and Leisinger “Ethical Values and International Sales Contracts”, above n 6, 
at 270.  
197 Schwenzer and Hachem “The Scope of the CISG Provisions on Damages” , above n 
191, at 94. 
198 Schwenzer and Leisinger “Ethical Values and International Sales Contracts”, above n 6, 
at 274. 
199 Schwenzer and Hachem “The Scope of the CISG Provisions on Damages” , above n 
191, at 95. 
200  At 93; The Principles of European Contract Law 2002, art 9:501(2); UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010, art 7.4.2. 
54 
 
sets of rules suggests a shift form a strict economic benefits approach 
towards greater protection of the performance interest.  
However, Schlechtriem has warned against allowing recovery for non-
pecuniary loss in the case of ethical non-conformity.201 He argues that while 
it is tempting to allow damages in this situation in order to ‘punish’ the 
producers of unethical goods,202 allowing damages without any loss would 
essentially amount to imposing the buyer’s moral convictions on the seller, 
and punishing it for offending the buyer’s sensibilities. 203  Moreover, 
according to Schlechtriem, the recovery of these so-called ‘punitive’ 
damages would depend on the individual beliefs of the judge or arbitrator in 
question, leading to diverging results in different jurisdictions. 204  This 
would undermine the uniformity of the CISG’s application.205 
Although Schlechtriem’s arguments are persuasive, they are based on the 
assumption that the buyer has not suffered any loss apart from 
“disappointment and hurt feelings”, and therefore these damages are 
necessarily punitive. 206  It has, however, been established above that the 
buyer has suffered a real loss as a result of the breach and should be entitled 
to compensatory (not punitive) damages. If one takes this view, 
Schlechtriem’s arguments lose their edge. It is true that if these damages 
were punitive, they would be awarded based on the individual views of the 
judge or arbitrator deciding the case, which would be undesirable. However, 
compensatory damages are aimed at compensating the buyer’s loss rather 
than deterring or punishing the seller’s ‘immoral’ conduct. If damages are 
awarded, this will be to compensate the buyer because it has been deprived 
of its performance interest. The seller is not being punished for offending 
the buyer, and there is no imposition of judges’ and arbitrators’ moral 
convictions on the seller. This is merely a case of giving effect to the 
buyer’s performance interest under the contract.  
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In sum, at least in this context, damages should be awarded to protect an 
aggrieved party’s performance interest. Accordingly, a buyer who has 
suffered no economic loss as a result of the seller’s delivery of goods 
produced using child labour should nevertheless be entitled to damages 
based on its right to performance. The issue then becomes how to calculate 
these damages.  
3 How could these damages be calculated?  
Schwenzer and others suggest three possible ways to measure damages in 
this type of case, depending on the circumstances. These will now be 
considered. 
(a) Difference between price paid and ordinary market price  
Where a buyer has paid more than the goods’ ordinary market price to 
ensure that they are manufactured in compliance with human rights, 
Schwenzer and Hachem argue that it is entitled to damages equal to the 
difference between the market value of the goods and what it paid.207 Thus, 
if a buyer pays $X higher than the goods’ market price to ensure that they 
are manufactured without using child labour, it is entitled to recover $X if 
this requirement is breached.208 This sum represents the buyer’s interest in 
the correct performance of the contract.209 This approach is appropriate as it 
directly compensates the buyer for the loss of its right to receive the goods it 
paid for. However, this method will only be useful where the buyer has paid 
extra for the promise that the goods will be produced ethically. Another 
method is therefore required for other situations.  
(b) Difference between market prices of conforming and non-
conforming goods 
Schwenzer also suggests that more generally, the measure of damages will 
be the difference between the respective market prices of the goods 
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contracted for and the non-conforming goods.”210 This difference in value is 
recoverable even if it has not been reflected in the resale price.211 Thus, the 
buyer in this situation can recover the difference between the market values 
of goods manufactured under humane conditions, and goods produced in 
violation of human rights.212  
Where the market value of the non-conforming goods can be assessed, this 
approach is also apposite, as it compensates the buyer for the difference 
between what it bargained and paid for, and what it received. However, as 
Schwenzer points out, the usefulness of this approach is limited to situations 
to where a market for non-conforming goods exists.213 For example, it is 
unlikely that there is “a market for t-shirts fabricated by 10-year-olds under 
inhumane conditions”.214 Another measurement is therefore required where 
no such market exists. 
(c) Gain-based damages  
Where the diminished value of the goods cannot be determined using one of 
the above two methods, Schwenzer and others argue that damages should be 
measured according to the profits made by the seller as a result of the 
breach.215  Thus, according to these commentators, a buyer can claim as 
minimum damages the amount by which the seller reduced its production 
costs (and increased its profits) by using child labour instead of employing 
adults. 216  Schwenzer and Hachem claim that while this measure is 
technically gain-based, it is “still in the realm of compensatory damages” 
because the breaching party’s gains can be viewed as an indication of the 
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loss suffered by the aggrieved party.217 Hence, “the question is not one of 
disgorgement of benefits, but of calculation of damages in accordance with 
the principle of full compensation.” 218  It is also claimed that if these 
damages were not allowed, there would be a risk of courts resorting to 
domestic remedies to compensate the claimant, thus undermining the 
CISG.219 
Although an aggrieved buyer should undoubtedly be compensated in this 
situation, it is submitted that this method is unsuitable. This is firstly 
because the production costs that the seller saves by using child labour is in 
no way reflective of the loss suffered by the buyer. The buyer’s loss does 
not arise from the fact that the seller is paying its workers too little (and in 
doing so maximising its own profits). It arises from the fact that the buyer 
has not received the goods it bargained for. The seller’s maximisation of 
profits has nothing to do with the harm to the buyer’s performance interest. 
This leads to the conclusion that these damages would effectively be a 
punitive award designed to strip unscrupulous sellers of their ill-gotten 
profits. This is supported further by Schwenzer’s emphasis on preventing 
the seller from “get[ting] off scot-free”,220 as well as preventing breaches of 
human rights, 221  when justifying this approach. While punishing and 
deterring unethical conduct may be a positive result of a damages claim 
from the perspective of a socially conscious buyer, the wording of art 74 
makes it clear that damages under the CISG must be compensatory, rather 
than punitive.  
Furthermore, measuring damages in this way would be unlikely to 
adequately compensate a claimant’s loss.  Child labour is likely to take 
place in developing countries where workers are paid comparatively very 
little. The difference between wages paid to children and adults in these 
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countries is unlikely to amount to anything more than nominal damages, 
which may not reflect the claimant’s loss. Moreover, this measure would be 
unsuitable where the use of child labour occurs further down the supply 
chain, and information about production costs cannot be adduced as 
evidence.  
Given the flaws in the above approach, a new method of calculating 
damages is required if a buyer is to be adequately compensated.  
(d) A proposed solution: hypothetical negotiation damages  
It is proposed that in this situation, damages should be awarded based on a 
sum that the buyer could reasonably have demanded in return for relaxing 
the terms of the contract and allowing the seller to deliver goods produced 
using child labour. 222 The amount determined would depend on the 
circumstances, including the seriousness of the breach and the level of 
ethical commitment shown by the buyer. For example, if the buyer deals 
exclusively in fair trade goods and it is essential to it that its goods are 
produced ethically, it could reasonably demand more to allow the seller to 
deliver ethically tainted goods than a regular trader could.  
The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike the disgorgement of 
profits measure mentioned above) it compensates the buyer for the actual 
loss suffered. Because it is based on the amount a reasonable person in the 
buyer’s position would demand to allow the breach, it acknowledges the 
fact that the buyer would not have paid the same amount for the goods had it 
known about the breach. Thus, it directly compensates the buyer for the loss 
of both its performance interest and its ability to strike a better bargain. This 
approach also gives the judge or arbitrator discretion to award damages that 
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are more than nominal, and thus enables a buyer to receive adequate 
compensation for its loss.  
Moreover, unlike an account of profits, this measure focuses on 
compensating the buyer’s loss, rather than stripping the seller of its ill-
gotten gains.223 Thus, it is consistent with the compensatory aim of art 74.  
4 Conclusion  
In sum, a buyer who has purchased non-conforming goods produced using 
child labour should be able to recover damages for the loss of its 
performance interest. If it cannot be determined how much the value of the 
goods has decreased due to the breach, damages should be calculated using 
a ‘hypothetical negotiation’ measurement rather than an account of profits. 
This approach properly compensates the buyer for its loss, and is also 
consistent with the compensatory nature of art 74.  
V Conclusion  
This paper has argued that the CISG can be used as a tool to prevent child 
labour. This is because not only can buyers explicitly require that goods are 
child labour-free, but in many situations, the conformity requirements in art 
35 of the CISG can be used to require child labour-free goods, even when 
this is not expressly required by the contract.  
This requirement may be inferred under arts 8 and 9(1) based on the parties’ 
negotiations, prior dealings, mutual participation in a voluntary initiative 
prohibiting child labour, or their incorporation of standard terms prohibiting 
child labour. In certain industries, the requirement will form an implied term 
under art 9(2). Finally, the use of child labour may render the goods unfit 
for either their ordinary or particular purpose. Moreover, a buyer can 
recover damages if the seller breaches this obligation. Along with loss of 
                                                             
223 It is accepted by common law courts that the Wrotham Park measure of damages, which 
is similar to this measure, is compensatory rather than restitutionary: Peter Devonshire 
Account of Profits, above n 224, at 164; Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 at 281-282, 
291; WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc 
[2007] EWCA Civ 286, [2008] 1 WLR 445 at [29] and [38]-[39]. 
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profits, the buyer may be entitled to damages for loss of goodwill (whether 
or not there is any discernible financial harm flowing from the loss). 
Furthermore, a buyer who has not suffered any loss of profits or goodwill 
should still in principle be entitled to damages for the loss of its 
performance interest.  
As companies continue to realise the value of an ‘ethical’ reputation, they 
will increasingly seek to enforce ethical standards through their contracts. It 
is therefore expected that the CISG will play an increasingly important role 
in the elimination of child labour in the future. While the focus of the paper 
has been on the prevention of child labour, it is also likely that the CISG 
will be used in a similar way to protect other fundamental human rights. 
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